Boeing 767 crash in Miami
Friends have been asking me to help them understand the recent Boeing 767 crash at KMIA (see “5 dead, 5 injured after Amazon cargo plane overruns runway at MIA, sheriff says” (NBC)).
The plane is reported to have crashed at 1758Z, two minutes before 2 pm Eastern time. Based on recordings at liveatc.net, however, it seems that the crash was closer to 1753Z. Here are the weather reports before and after:
METAR KMIA 061853Z 00000KT 10SM TS SCT025CB SCT070 SCT170 BKN250 29/24 A2993
SPECI KMIA 061813Z 20012G17KT 10SM TS SCT025CB BKN048 BKN100 BKN250 30/23 A2992
METAR KMIA 061753Z 19017G26KT 10SM TS SCT020CB BKN048 BKN150 BKN250 30/22 A2994 RMK AO2 PK WND 18026/1752 WSHFT 1737 SLP137 TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG E-S TS E-S MOV E CB DSNT NW
SPECI KMIA 061713Z VRB03KT 10SM TS SCT030CB BKN050 BKN250 32/22 A2992 RMK AO2 TSB12 OCNL LTGICCG S TS S MOV E
Although the closest report to the crash is the 1753Z METAR and the wind was 19017G26KT (from 190 true at 17 knots, gusting 26), shortly after the crash the ATC Tower is heard telling listeners that the wind was only 190 at 8 (source: ATC app, an interesting new service). Depending on which weather report we think was applicable at the moment of the landing, there was a tailwind component of somewhere between 3 and 8 knots on Runway 30 (magnetic 304; true heading of about 300 (Miami magnetic variation is 5W)).
It is unclear why the heavy Boeing was assigned Runway 30, which is only 9360′ long and, due partly to a displaced threshold, has a “landing distance available” (LDA) of 7913′. That’s enough to allow a B767 to land in 60% of the available runway, but doesn’t leave a lot of additional room for error considering the typical final approach speed of 130-140 knots. Runway 27, by contrast, offers nearly 13,000′ of LDA and has more favorable alignment with wind coming from 190.
Typical Florida summertime heavy rain does not seem to have been a factor in this accident, but in any case all of the runways at KMIA are grooved and that’s supposed to prevent hydroplaning (the “dry” braking distance is used for planning even if the runway is actually wet). ATC communications with other aircraft before the accident don’t reveal anything out of the ordinary. The accident aircraft did not declare an emergency or report any issues prior to the accident.
Most runway overruns are caused by excessive energy: too much airspeed and too much altitude. It is tough to dissipate this energy if one lands halfway down the runway at a higher-than-standard groundspeed (remember that kinetic energy varies as speed squared). Why isn’t there a computer in an expensive jet that looks at the GPS position relative to the runway and the groundspeed and shouts “Go Around!” if an overrun seems likely? There is, but not for the typical jet. Airbus ROPS (Runway Overrun Prevention System) was introduced in 2009 on the A380 and has now been extended to the entire family of idiot-proof airliners. It says “Runway Too Short!” if it expects an overrun. Embraer has something similar called Runway Overrun Awareness and Alerting System and deploys it on airliners as well as on the single-pilot Phenom 100 and Phenom 300 personal jets (where “personal” means “affordable for Nvidia and AI company employees”). The Embraer system arrived on the Phenom 300E in 2020 and has a clearer warning: “Overrun; Go Around”. The Europeans are supposedly trying to require that all newly registered airliners have something like this.
Not a great day for aviation and, so far, not enough information to begin to guess at the cause of the accident.
Related:
- “Pilot in Amazon Cargo Plane Crash Repeatedly Flunked Flight Tests” (TIME 2019, regarding a B767 crash into the water near Houston)



















































































