Category: War

How does the fancy bunker buster bomb work?

by philg

People are debating how much damage was done to the underground nuclear weapons facilities built and run by the noble Iranians (an analysis by the unfortunately named “ISIS”). Supposedly, the energy of an underground explosion weakens via an r^3 formula (i.e., falls off as the cube of the distance from the explosion), thus making it critical to place the explosion next to the entirely peaceful underground bunker that is the aggressor’s target. (By contrast, an explosion in air falls off as r^2 and an underwater explosion, e.g., from a depth charge, falls off even more gradually.) Putting the bomb into the desired latitude/longitude position is straightforward, but what control does an attacker have over the depth of explosion?

Despite my skepticism that precision weapons can achieve a decisive victory (as long as the Iranians have a functioning oil and gas industry they will, in my opinion, have the resources they need to develop whatever weapons they want to develop), I asked Prof. Dr. ChatGPT, PhD in Bomb Design: “What technical mechanisms does the GBU-57A/B MOP bomb have to ensure that it detonates at the proper depth to destroy an underground bunker?”

Answer (including an image generated by ChatGPT, which you can tell because “measurement” isn’t spelled correctly):

The GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) uses a combination of inertial sensing, hardened fuzing, and time-delay logic to ensure detonation at the proper depth. While detailed specifications are classified, here are the known or inferred technical mechanisms it likely uses:

1. Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) / Accelerometers

  • The bomb contains an IMU that tracks the weapon’s deceleration as it penetrates the ground.
  • By analyzing deceleration patterns, the system can estimate penetration depth and determine when the warhead has reached the intended depth or structural resistance (e.g., reinforced concrete).

2. Hard Target Smart Fuzing (HTSF)

  • MOP likely employs multi-event, programmable fuzes, capable of:
    • Delaying detonation for a set duration after impact
    • Using deceleration signatures to detect when it strikes different material layers (e.g., soil, rock, concrete)
    • Triggering detonation based on penetration depth estimates or when further penetration slows/stops

3. Time-Delay Fuze Programming

  • Before release, operators can program a preset time-delay for detonation based on intelligence about bunker depth.
  • This is used in combination with sensor data to refine detonation timing.

4. Structural Stress Sensors

  • Embedded strain gauges or piezoelectric sensors can detect physical resistance changes as the bomb passes through materials.
  • These help distinguish when the warhead has entered the actual bunker structure versus overlying rock or soil.

5. Robust Casing and Kinetic Penetration

  • Although not a sensor, the MOP’s hardened steel casing and over 30,000-pound weight give it the ability to reach over 60 meters (200 feet) into concrete or earth before detonation—making precise depth control essential and achievable only with advanced fuzing.

Summary

The MOP uses sensor-based inertial tracking, programmable fuzes, delay logic, and material sensing to control detonation at the correct depth. It does not rely on GPS during penetration, as signal loss is inevitable underground. Instead, it fuses inertial and physical resistance data to achieve its goal: destroying deeply buried, hardened targets like WMD bunkers.

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How soon before the United Nations begins to rebuild Iran’s nuclear weapons infrastructure?

by philg

The head of the UN decries the (attempted?) destruction of Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities:

Presumably the remedy for what Trump did is for the United Nations to undo. Alternatively, maybe the UN could get the Iranians onto the Palestinian plan in which all of their day-to-day expenses (shelter, food, health care, education) are paid for by EU and US taxpayers, thus freeing Iran to spend up to 100 percent of its GDP on military activities.

Speaking of Iranians, what’s our estimate for the percentage of Iranians who are working against their government? I don’t see how it is possible for Israel and the U.S. to hit the right targets unless there are a lot of traitors inside Iran (presumably they would call themselves “patriots”, of course, but they would be traitors from the perspective of the current recognized and legitimate government of Iran).

Loosely related, here’s a fun assemblage of quotes:

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The Muslim conquest of Persia, the latest chapter?

by philg

(Non-Arab) Iran has been in the news lately due to the country’s so-far-unsuccessful attempt to win the 1948 Arab League war against Israel (armies from Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt invaded while Saudi Arabia sent troops). Although the majority of the Arab belligerents of 1948 are still technically at war with Israel (Jordan and Egypt being the exceptions), they have mostly delegated the hard work of attacking Israel to Iran and its proxies. Could this be seen as a chapter in what Wikipedia calls “The Muslim conquest of Persia”?

As part of the early Muslim conquests, which were initiated by Muhammad in 622, the Rashidun Caliphate conquered the Sasanian Empire between 632 and 654. This event led to the decline of Zoroastrianism, which had been the official religion of Persia (or Iran) since the time of the Achaemenid Empire. The persecution of Zoroastrians by the early Muslims during and after this conflict prompted many of them to flee eastward to India, where they were granted refuge by various kings.

While Arabia was experiencing the rise of Islam in the 7th century, Persia was struggling with unprecedented levels of political, social, economic, and military weakness; the Sasanian army had greatly exhausted itself in the Byzantine–Sasanian War of 602–628. Following the execution of Sasanian shah Khosrow II in 628, Persia’s internal political stability began deteriorating at a rapid pace. Subsequently, ten new royal claimants were enthroned within the next four years. Shortly afterwards, Persia was further devastated by the Sasanian Interregnum, a large-scale civil war that began in 628 and resulted in the government’s decentralization by 632.

Amidst Persia’s turmoil, the first Rashidun invasion of Sasanian territory took place in 633, when the Rashidun army conquered parts of Asoristan, which was the Sasanians’ political and economic centre in Mesopotamia. Later, the regional Rashidun army commander Khalid ibn al-Walid was transferred to oversee the Muslim conquest of the Levant, and as the Rashidun army became increasingly focused on the Byzantine Empire, the newly conquered Mesopotamian territories were retaken by the Sasanian army. The second Rashidun invasion began in 636, under Sa’d ibn Abi Waqqas, when a key victory at the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah permanently ended all Sasanian control to the west of modern-day Iran. For the next six years, the Zagros Mountains, a natural barrier, marked the political boundary between the Rashidun Caliphate and the Sasanian Empire. In 642, Umar ibn al-Khattab, eight years into his reign as Islam’s second caliph, ordered a full-scale invasion of the rest of the Sasanian Empire. Directing the war from the city of Medina in Arabia, Umar’s quick conquest of Persia in a series of coordinated and multi-pronged attacks became his greatest triumph, contributing to his reputation as a great military and political strategist. In 644, however, he was assassinated by the Persian craftsman Abu Lu’lu’a Firuz, who had been captured by Rashidun troops and brought to Arabia as a slave.

The Persians had more than 4,000 years of history before the Muslim Conquest. They were peers to the Romans and Chinese. The Persians had their own language and religion (Zoroastrianism). Today they adhere to a religion developed by Arabs, are governed by a system developed by Arabs, need to learn Arabic to read their religious texts, and endure economic isolation as well as, recently, military attacks in order to participate in a fight started by Arabs.

Would it be fair, then, to say that Iran taking over the fight against Israel from Arabs is another chapter in the Muslim Conquest of Persia? Arab nations get all of the benefits of peace while still technically being at war with Israel. Iran suffers many of the hardships of war while still technically being at peace with Israel.

Separately, let’s check in with how Iran is doing. Elon Musk says that humans are going extinct. Let’s see how the modern-day Persians are trending in terms of population:

According to the World Bank, Iranians were rapidly getting wealthier when they decided to overthrow their Shah. They are slightly richer today, in nominal GDP, than they were when the Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979, a remarkable achievement considering that population has more than doubled over that time period and a lot of Iran’s wealth is derived from natural resources.

What about the Arab countries that have handed off their fight against the Jews to the Persians?

Loosely related, a sophisticated analysis of the Iran-Israel fight and its interaction with U.S. policy…

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General MacArthur in Manila 1945 and Israel in Gaza today

by philg

I’m been reading The Battle of Manila: Poisoned Victory in the Pacific War (Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, a professor at the U.S. Naval War College; published 2025 by Oxford University Press (i.e., a military work from a publisher in a country that can’t defend its own border)).

The loss of the Philippines in the first place was due to incompetence, similar to how Japanese success at Pearl Harbor was due to incompetence (failure to heed a radar warning of planes inbound from the NW). Having squeezed and provoked Japan, the U.S. expected attacks in Asia and yet the Japanese caught the Americans by surprise:

Recalled to active duty as the United States was on the verge of war, MacArthur wanted to defend the entire archipelago. “We are going to make it so very expensive for any nation to attack these islands that no one will try it,” he explained. On the first day of the war, the Japanese caught the air forces under his command on the ground and destroyed them. MacArthur then attempted to defend the entire island of Luzon. While his men did well tactically—fighting the Japanese to a standstill—their supplies were in the wrong positions, which sealed their fate as they retreated into the cul-de-sac that was the Bataan Peninsula.

The decision to fight in 1945 to take back the Philippines might also be said to have been an example of American military incompetence. Most of the senior officers wanted to ignore the Philippines and capture Formosa (present-day Taiwan) instead as a more useful base for bombing and invading Japan (USNI article). The Philippines would have been freed from Japanese rule in August 1945 when Japan unconditionally surrendered, though of course it was tough to know that in late 1944.

The book is about the fight for one city, Manila, and as such there are some parallels to the present-day fighting in Gaza. What the two battles have in common:

  • a mostly urban environment
  • the majority of people in the environment were/are not soldiers
  • the army trying to take the city (US in 1945; IDF today) was trying to minimize the number of non-soldiers killed
  • the army defending the city was indifferent to the number of non-soldiers killed and/or actually trying to increase the number of non-soldiers killed

The differences:

  • the non-soldiers of Manila were hostile to the defending army (Japan) and, in fact, was an organized guerilla force against the army whereas the non-soldiers of Gaza are fervent supporters of the defending army
  • the army attacking Manila (US) was trying to minimize damage to buildings and other infrastructure
  • the army attacking Manila (US) wasn’t trying to feed the army defending Manila (Japan) and, in many cases, defenders had to surrender or commit suicide because they’d run out of food and/or water

The book reminds us that war is most glorious when seen in the rearview mirror:

One of the great myths of World War II is that the American public immediately rallied to the cause after Pearl Harbor. The truth is that men had to be drafted, and they did not want to be in either the Army or the Philippines. Willard Higdon was honest about his motivations: “I was 27 yrs old, with a wife and a 5 yr. old dtr. I did not want to go.”

The Japanese actually weren’t that excited about owning the Philippines:

The main reason for their invasion in 1941 and 1942 was geopolitical. The Philippines had few natural resources that the Japanese economy required. What they wanted was to drive the Americans out of the western Pacific and, once that was done, they wanted to liquidate their commitment to the Philippines quickly. The Japanese had little interest in turning the archipelago into a Japanese colony.

The enemy doesn’t always cooperate with one’s plans…

Even as late as February 5 [the battle was February 3-March 3], MacArthur had no plan for an urban battle. “I do not believe anybody expected the Japs to make a house-to-house defense of Manila,” Eichelberger told his wife. The general belief—at MacArthur’s headquarters, at Krueger’s headquarters, and with the press—was that the Japanese would evacuate without a fight. Thirty years later, when he sat down to write his memoirs, Chase could not understand why anyone had made this assumption. “It was counter to everything the Nips had done in previous campaigns.”

The U.S. had almost no experience with the kind of fighting that was to ensue:

Other than some short operations in World War I and a few in the European theater, the last time Americans had fought in cities had been in 1864 and 1865 with the battles of Atlanta and Richmond. There are seven major characteristics of urban warfare. The first is that artificial terrain features constrain and channel movement. Buildings become significant geographical objectives. Roads direct advances in certain directions. Both can be barriers. Depending on the material used in their construction, they might be quite vulnerable to military action or quite impervious. Some weapons have better utility than others in the city, and these issues often influence tactics. Another feature is that ground operations are compressed and decentralized. Engagements are between small, tactical units—squads, platoons, companies—for small, geographic objects—a room, a building, or a city block. A third factor is that combat usually becomes three-dimensional. Soldiers fight ground operations as in any other form of ground combat, but they also advance and fight in sewers and blast holes through basement walls. They also have to fight an opponent that might control the floor of a building immediately above or below them, and they might move from rooftop to rooftop. City combat always consumes more time than other forms of fighting. This factor is relative, though. How slow is slow? The month-long fight for Manila was significant compared to other ground operations fought in the Pacific, but nothing compared to the eight-month-long struggle for Stalingrad or the twenty-eight-month-long siege of Leningrad. A fifth factor in urban warfare is the presence of civilians. There are always non-combatant deaths in urban operations and their presence requires some effort at stability operations afterward, but sometimes also during the period of active combat. Civilians can be assets or liabilities when it comes to intelligence gathering, as both the Americans and Japanese would learn. The ready influence of the media is another factor. Cities by their very nature are media centers and always have resident journalists. Since urban areas are also important population, political, economic, financial, cultural, religious, trade, and transportation centers, their fate attracts the interest of reporters. A final dynamic of urban warfare is the outsized ramification of its outcomes. Location matters, and cities are always more important than undeveloped countryside, and engagements for their control have more influence than engagements in isolated areas. Each of these would be in play in Manila.

As in the Gaza fighting, the army trying to take the city owns the airspace:

The US forces also had total air superiority, and piper cub observation planes loitered over the city looking for targets.

(Note failure to capitalize Piper Cub!)

A civilian population that does not support the defending army makes a city tough to defend:

The Japanese were well aware that the Filipinos on Luzon were welcoming the Americans enthusiastically. They resented this and they had orders—which they implemented willingly—to make the Manileños pay. The Battle of Manila was defined by the methodical targeting of the civilian population. The Japanese historian Hayashi Hirofumi has argued, given where most of the incidents took place, that the majority of these killings were done by the Imperial Japanese Army.1 Their orders, though, came from Rear Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji. He made the determination that there was no difference between Filipino guerrillas and civilians. “When the enemy invaded Manila, the citizens were welcoming the enemy well and disrupted all of our fighting action,” he reported. “The number of citizens is estimated to be about seven hundred thousand, but on the front line north of the Pasig River between 3 and 5 February, the general public carried out the following guerrilla activities: communicate with U.S. troops before our attacks, shoot our soldiers, and report our locations to U.S. troops. As a result, our surprise attack was infeasible, and many of our troops were unable to achieve their objectives.”2 The attitude that all Filipinos were the enemy was widespread among the Japanese defenders. Taguchi Hiroshi, a Navy aviation mechanic who became a prisoner of war, explained to U.S. Army investigators in late March: “The enlisted men in the lower ranks, believed that, since the Filipinos indicated that they were cooperative toward Americans in their attitude and had ill feeling toward the Japanese, because prices of food and other articles during the period when we occupied the Philippines went very high . . . , higher officials ordered the destruction of Manila and the Filipinos.”

Some locals were more creative than others…

“The real heroines at San Agustin were the prostitutes, they were the ones that helped,” Gisbert declared. The Japanese had concentrated them in the Intramuros. Gisbert guessed that their numbers were in the hundreds. They were willing to serve as nurses. They were also quite good at scrounging. They could acquire clean linen, or whisky, which Gisbert used as anesthesia. All of which suggests that they had a way of influencing Japanese supply officers.

Even as American soldiers were getting killed, MacArthur refused to let them fight effectively (i.e., by using artillery) because he doesn’t want his former home trashed:

The general was genuinely horrified by what was unfolding in Manila, and seemingly unable to process it. “MacArthur was shattered by the holocaust,” Lieutenant Paul P. Rogers, the headquarters typist, observed. Everything he had done to spare Manila in 1941 was being undone by his own troops, and the major coup of taking the city intact with its port facilities undamaged was falling apart in front of him. Admitting to that kind of setback was not in him. Suddenly the general and his command had a vested interest in making sure there was as little coverage of Manila—positive or negative—as possible. A press report that declared, “Manila is dying” set him off. MacArthur ordered Diller to block any usage of that phrase. He also ordered the units under his command to refrain from using artillery in the city. “That was most unlike the General, who prided himself on winning victories with minimum loss of life,” Diller recalled.

Eventually the subordinate officers wear MacArthur down:

He appointed a three-man committee to talk with MacArthur about the artillery restrictions. After listening to the three, MacArthur, despite his vehement and emotional initial response changed course completely. His subordinates were making it clear that they were not only taking heavy losses, but at rates they could not sustain. With reporters now in the mix, he could ignore that consideration only so long. He removed all the limits on both the artillery and on the media. His public relations man was happy: “They did start using artillery, and it all worked out just exactly the way I wanted it to.” The removal of restrictions on artillery was the third major event that shaped the battle for Manila. Despite their reputation as being a bunch of “yes men,” the staff had pushed back against the general and gotten him to reverse himself. Robert S. Beightler was happy with this decision: “From this point on, we really went to town.” Beightler was advocating any means which he believed would speed up the tempo of combat and save both American and Filipino lives. After the battle ended, he reported to Krueger: “the fantastic defenses of small pockets of resistance which had been isolated required the employment of all available weapons.” Some of this argument is rather weak. The infantry used indirect fire as a crutch to avoid close combat. The problem: it resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians. Figuring the exact numbers killed in Manila is a tricky business. It seems

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Justifying our total war against Japan

by philg

It’s the 80th anniversary of a bombing raid on Tokyo in which the American military killed 100,000 Japanese civilians in one night (Wokipedia). Did the Japanese attack on our military installations in Hawaii justify our attacks on their civilians?

University of Alaska in Fairbanks runs a beautiful museum and it answers the above question to some extent.

Right now, about one fifth of the core exhibit space at the Museum of the North is devoted to the victimization of 220 Japanese-Alaskans whom President Franklin Roosevelt ordered interned (with Supreme Court approval) and also the evacuation of 800 Native Alaskans from islands thought vulnerable to Japanese attack.

The PhD scholars explain on a sign leading into the exhibit that the Japanese were on track to conquer interior Alaska, western Canada, and Seattle:

If we hadn’t waged total war on this enemy, including killing 100,000 civilians in one night (pre-atomic bombs), folks in Seattle would to this day be forced to live a Japanese lifestyle. Certainly, it wouldn’t have made sense to engage in the settlement negotiations that the Japanese expected after Pearl Harbor.

What else goes on in the museum? First, visitors are reminded of the irrationality of W-2/1099 work in the American Welfare State (admission is $20 for chumps; free for EBT cardholders):

The PhDs in charge of the museum use native languages whenever possible (Troth Yeddha’ is apparently not, as I’d thought, a location of one of Jabba the Hutt’s branch offices) and also note that the noble indigenous themselves don’t want to use these languages anymore (consistent with John McWhorter’s explanation of how humans converge toward a single language in a media- and telecommunications-rich world)

Compare your level of patience and attention to detail to Cynthia Gibson’s, who sewed salmon vertebrae into a dress:

The Into the Wild bus will be on display here soon:

Looking for decorating ideas?

Even without indoor plumbing you can have a beautiful home:

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What would the UK be like if it had stayed out of World War I and/or World War II?

by philg

Today is the 80th anniversary of the Yalta Conference, in which the UK, US, and Soviet Union agreed on plans to force German civilians to work as slaves for years after the war. Clearing minefields was a popular assignment (popular with the assigners, that is) and also agricultural labor (i.e., American president FDR was carrying on in the rich American Democrat tradition of agricultural slave labor). This post looks at the question of whether the benefits of this slave labor justified, for the UK, the costs of going to war and staying at war.

I’ve been listening to When the Sea Came Alive: An Oral History of D-Day, in which participants describe the heroism of the British and their Allies during the 1944 Normandy invasion (also the cheerful and willing collaboration of most people in France). It’s a worthwhile book, but it doesn’t explain why the British sacrifice was worth it other than “Nazis are bad.”

Let’s back up to 1900. Is it fair to say that the UK circa 1900 was the most successful and richest country in the history of humanity? The sun never set on the British Empire, which included India. The Royal Navy was the world’s most powerful. Compare to today. The UK is a predominantly Islamic society (measured by hours spent on religious activities) jammed with low-skill immigrants. Wages are absurdly low by U.S. standards. GDP per capita is lower than in the poorest U.S. states. After decades of open borders, the core English part of the UK lacks cultural cohesion. The main project of the UK seems to have been assembling humans from the world’s most violent and dysfunctional societies and expecting that they and their descendants won’t behave in a violent or dysfunctional manner once parked in the UK. The result is the Southport stabbings (by a young UK-born Rwandan) and the Rotherham child sexual exploitation scandal and similar. The trajectory of the UK from 1900 to the present looks like that of a country that lost multiple wars, each one having drained away its resources and treasure and each one resulting in the country being occupied by millions of non-British people.

What if the UK had never fought World War I? (As the victors, we typically think of Germany as the aggressor but it was the UK, without ever having been attacked, that declared war on Germany in 1914.) Let’s assume that Germany would, therefore, have attained all of its war goals. Would that have been worse than what the UK has done to itself? Germany’s goals in WWI were to steal some territory from neighboring countries, especially ports, but certainly not to take anything from the UK other than perhaps a competitive edge in colonizing far-away places that the UK didn’t hold onto even after ostensibly “winning” WWI. By not entering the war, the UK would have avoided the death of 6 percent of its male population (nearly 1 million men, though let’s keep in mind Hillary Clinton’s trenchant observation that “Women have always been the primary victims of war.”) and preserved a huge amount of treasure that it could have applied to beefing up its home defense and Royal Navy. Perhaps even more important, would the German people have elected Adolf Hitler if Germany had won WWI? The Nazis represented a dramatic change from previous German governments and a big part of Hitler’s appeal was that he would turn around the downward trajectory of the loss of WWI and the humiliation of the Treaty of Versailles. Without the British stepping in to fight WWI, therefore, they wouldn’t have had to consider whether to fight WWII. The UK would have needed to coexist with a more powerful Germany, but not a Germany with a plan to dominate all of Europe. Maybe a more powerful Germany could have pushed the UK aside in some of its colonial ambitions, but the UK lost all of its colonies in the “fight WWI and WWII” case.

The “fight WWI, but leave the Nazis alone and don’t fight WWII” analysis is a little tougher. Hitler supposedly didn’t want to fight the English, whom he admired. He envisioned a German-dominated European union (not too different from today’s “European Union”, including the idea of Jew-/Israel-hatred in most parts of Europe) and, even after the British declared war (without having been attacked in any way), a negotiated peace with the UK (see the background section of Operation Sea Lion in Wokipedia). If the British had used their resources to turn Britain into an island fortress rather than into daily fights with the Germans maybe Germany would never have bothered to bomb or invade the UK (Ireland was neutral regarding the Nazis and Germany never bothered Ireland). The UK might have lost some of its worldwide influence to a more powerful Germany, but the UK has lost all of its worldwide influence in the “fight WWI and WWII” case. As bad as Nazi Germany was, it never did anything so bad that the French weren’t happy to collaborate with the Nazis. Given the huge cost in lives, money, and years of home-front sacrifice, it seems that the UK would be in a better place today if it had let the Germans have a free hand in Europe from 1939 onward.

We can’t even say that the British sacrifices in WWI and WWII defeated the Nazis because we are informed that Nazis today (“far right”) are more numerous than ever and live all over the US and UK. Who wants to explain how the UK’s involvement in WWI and WWII makes rational sense in the light of how things turned out for the UK (i.e., the spectacular decline of the nation).

Related:

  • Proving that none of my ideas are original, the Journal of Diurnal Epistolary Communication (Daily Mail) published a scholarly work on this subject in 2009… “PETER HITCHENS: If we hadn’t fought World War 2, would we still have a British Empire?”: how come we look back on the Second World War from conditions we might normally associate with defeat and occupation? … We are a second-rate power, rapidly slipping into third-rate status. … We had then, as we have now, no substantial interests in Poland, the Czech lands, the Balkans or – come to that – France, Belgium or the Netherlands. … [regarding WWI] We had gained little and lost much to defend France, our historic enemy, against Germany. In a strange paradox, we had gone to war mainly to save our naval supremacy from a German threat – and ended it by conceding that supremacy to the United States, our ally. … What about the Holocaust? There seems to be a common belief that we went to war to save the Jews of Europe. This is not true. We went to war to save Poland, and then didn’t do so. … When, in 1942, the Germans began their ‘Final Solution’, reliable reports of the outrage were disbelieved or sat on. Later, when the information was beyond doubt, we turned down the opportunity to bomb the railway lines that led to Auschwitz. It is certainly hard to argue that the fate of Europe’s Jews would or could have been any worse than it was if we had stayed out of the war. [Maybe Jews would have been better off if the Nazis hadn’t been opposed in their efforts to dominate Europe. The Germans might have become so strong that they could have forced the UK to give up some of its colonial territory and then Germany would have forced Jews to move there, which was the original Nazi idea (get Jews out of Europe, not kill all Jews).]
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How long before the Gazans attack Israel again?

by philg

Here’s a recent video from Gaza showing a well-fed population, undamaged buildings, armed and uniformed soldiers, and freshly washed (/waxed?) vehicles:

If nothing else, Israel has convinced the Palestinians that war is a completely sustainable lifestyle during which their population will continue to expand and through which EU and US taxpayers will continue to supply unlimited food, health care, education, shelter, etc.

What are readers’ guesses as to when the Gazans’ next attack on Israel will be? As there are multiple armed groups within Gaza (e.g., the Islamic Resistance Movement (“Hamas”), UNRWA, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad), any of which can launch rockets at Israeli civilians, my guess is that the first rocket attacks will be on May 1, 2025 (Israel doesn’t return fire with 155mm artillery shells as one might expect, so there is no cost to the Gazans from attacking Israeli civilians). The October 7, 2023 attack on Israel was hugely popular among Palestinians polled as well as with the “international community” (Democrats in the U.S.; everyone at Harvard, Columbia, Brown; everyone in Ireland, Norway, and Spain; etc.) so it would be rational for the Gazans to do a repeat ASAP. On the other hand, it will take a while for Palestinians to fully rearm and reorganize and also a while for Israelis to become complacent about watching the border. Thus, my guess about the next major attack on Israel is October 7, 2027.

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How the term “Palestine” was used at Harvard prior to the arrival of Queers for Palestine

by philg

My mother‘s 1955 bachelor’s thesis, “The Synagogue and its Architecture”, uses the term “Palestine” 24 times, the adjective “Palestinian” 8 times, and the adjective “Palestinean” once (maybe this is a misspelling). Example from the Preface:

The thesis uses the term to describe present-day Israel even before the Roman era, e.g., prior to the 2nd century BC Maccabees (who gave us Hanukkah):

An example from Roman times:

“Palestine was the center of Jewish life”:

Loosely related, from Stanford University Press… Queer Palestine and the Empire of Critique:

From Ramallah to New York, Tel Aviv to Porto Alegre, people around the world celebrate a formidable, transnational Palestinian LGBTQ social movement. Solidarity with Palestinians has become a salient domain of global queer politics. Yet LGBTQ Palestinians, even as they fight patriarchy and imperialism, are themselves subjected to an “empire of critique” from Israeli and Palestinian institutions, Western academics, journalists and filmmakers, and even fellow activists. Such global criticism has limited growth and led to an emphasis within the movement on anti-imperialism over the struggle against homophobia.

I’m having some trouble understanding “LGBTQ Palestinians … are themselves subjected to an empire of critique”. I didn’t think that “critique” was the punishment for LGBTQ sexual activity under Islamic law.

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What is happening in Syria?

by philg

Our media is full of stories about fighting in Syria, but they all seem to be targeted at people who are smarter than I am and/or who have a much deeper understanding of history and geopolitics.

From the New York Times:

An array of different groups have been taking territory from the government in other parts of the country as well.

Clear as mud, in other words.

A few questions, for starters:

  • I thought that Turkey was fighting to prevent Kurds from having their own country. But now Turkey is also fighting to depose Assad, the secular ruler of Syria, so that Islamists can take over?
  • Syria declared war on Israel in 1948 and, like Lebanon but unlike Egypt and Jordan, was never interested in a peace treaty or recognition of Israel. If there is a new government, is Syria then still at war with Israel?
  • Does Israel have a dog in this fight? Would Assad retiring to Jeddah, as Idi Amin did, be good for Israel?

I would appreciate an overall high-level explanation.

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UNRWA school superintendent killed by a tank

by philg

Even before the vulnerability of tanks to drones was exposed in the Russia-Ukraine war, I couldn’t figure out why militaries were still paying for these dinosaurs.

A tale of two tanks… (2019):

… why do we have human-occupied tanks as part of our military? Wouldn’t it make more sense to have robotic/remote-controlled vehicles? Also, what chance do tanks stand against far more nimble anti-tank helicopters and airplanes (e.g., the Mi-24 or the A-10 Warthog)? Is the idea that we use tanks against lightly armed opponents, such as ISIS?

The war in Ukraine proves Isoroku Yamamoto right? (2022):

One feature of the war, as I understand it, is that the Russian military has had a lot of armored vehicles, e.g., tanks and ships, and these have proven vulnerable to inexpensive weapons on the Ukrainian side.

Who could have predicted this? Isoroku Yamamoto, one of the greatest thinkers and strategists of World War II (had Japan followed his advice, it would not have chosen to fight the U.S. to begin with). Admiral Yamamoto was an enthusiast for naval aviation starting in 1924 and correctly predicted that heavy expensive battleships would be almost useless going forward, vulnerable to submarines but especially to swarms of comparatively light and cheap airplanes. (And, of course, the great admiral was ultimately killed by U.S. fighter planes in 1943.)

I’m wondering why the U.S. Army wants to pay to keep 5,000 tanks in its inventory. If we’re fighting a peasant army equipped only with rifles, these tanks are obviously useful, but then we don’t need 5,000 of them. If we’re fighting a big battle in Europe, doesn’t the Russian experience in Ukraine show that the last place anyone would want to be is inside a tank and its illusory protection?

We’ve recently learned that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was killed by a tank (see, for example, “IDF releases footage of tank firing shell that killed Sinwar, pictures of weapons found in home”; there seem to be some alternative versions out of the fog of war in which this Palestinian leader (also UNRWA school employee?) was instead killed by a rifle bullet (“gun violence”)). Does this success rehabilitate the tank’s value in battle? Or does my question about why we need 5,000 of them still apply?

Separately, where on the Mall will President Kamala Harris put the Yahya Sinwar Memorial? Will Minneapolis put a Yahya Sinwar Boulevard next to George Perry Floyd Square? Will Dearborn, Michigan or Hamtramck, Michigan be renamed “Sinwar, Michigan” to honor the fallen fighter?

From “Israel unveils new Barak tank with AI, sensors and cameras” (Defense News, Sep 20, 2023):

(Maybe there could be a “Barack Hussein” variant of this tank and it would spread peace at the Nobel level?)

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