Does Hawaii prove that the U.S. can’t handle the electric car challenge?

On a recent trip to Hawaii (Big Island and Maui) I noticed that (1) nearly everyone drove a gas-powered car, (2) no public charging infrastructure was evident, and (3) all major-brand rental cars were gas-powered. Given that (a) it is challenging and expensive to drag fossil fuels to Hawaii, (b) that the state is ideally situated to harvest wind and solar energy, (c) few areas get cold enough to impair battery performance,(d) there are only a couple of major roads per island and cars can’t stray too far off these roads, and (e) that no state is friendlier to Big and Bigger Government, I wonder if this shows that electric vehicles are impractical in the U.S., other than for showing off one’s virtue on Facebook and within sanctimony cities.

Back in 2008, I wrote about the state’s attempt to build out an electric car system. That didn’t work out, obviously.

It would be seemingly simple to put charging stations every 20 miles along the roads ringing the Hawaiian volcanoes. Gas is more expensive in Hawaii than anywhere else in the U.S. (Motley Fool). Solar panels and wind turbines work better in Hawaii than in most other states. The state is not shy about government management of the economy.

Readers: What do you think? If electric cars can’t make it in Hawaii does that mean they can’t make it anywhere in the U.S.?

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American Defenders of the Jewish People

Based on my Facebook feed and live conversations with friends in Sanctimony Cities, I have learned that there is a new passion in America for defending the Jewish people. The enemy, of course, is Donald Trump (see previous posting). During the Obama Administration, the only irredeemably bad country on the planet that these folks could think of was Israel. Trips to the grocery store required thinking about whether it was more important to boycott Sabra Hummus or SodaStream.

What is the evidence that the Trumpenfuhrer is like Hitler and that the U.S. today is like Germany in the 1930s? Hitler talked about the Jews frequently. Donald Trump did not mention Jews following telephoned bomb threats to Jewish schools and community centers (my question of “How do we know that the threats were made by residents of the U.S.? Why couldn’t it be one foreign guy with an autodialer?” seems to have been answered (nytimes))

I pressed the Sincerely Concerned for concrete scenarios. I used a middle-aged guy within our social circle who has some Jewish ancestry as an example. Let’s call him “Abraham”. What specifically could the Trumpenfuhrer do to him? Couldn’t Abraham at least escape to Israel? The answers essentially amounted to a higher wealth or income tax for Jews or suspected Jews. Our government would confiscate his wealth before Abraham boarded his El Al flight.

I pointed out that Abraham’s wife, following a brief marriage, had gone down to the local family court and, under Massachusetts family law, stripped this guy of his two young children, his house, and 80 percent of his income going forward. What more could a government hostile to Jews take from him? “They could confiscate his savings,” was a first answer. I responded that legal fees on both sides of the divorce lawsuit had already consumed what had been the Abraham’s savings from 30+ years of working. “They could put him in an internment camp.” Why would the government want to incur the cost of imprisoning a middle-aged guy, whose health care costs even in prison are likely to be staggering, when they could just dump him off on the Israeli taxpayer? None of the American Defenders of the Jewish People (TM) had an answer for this.

Readers: What have you heard about concrete plans for a Trump-directed pogrom? How would it work against Jews who are U.S. citizens given that Trump has been unable to limit visas and new green cards for citizens of Libya, Somalia, Yemen, etc.? Is the idea that Trump first dispenses with the Federal judiciary and then turns his attention to the Jews?

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What do Beauty and the Beast story updates say about us?

A group of us enjoyed Disney’s Beauty and the Beast in IMAX 3D.

One of our companions complained that “It wasn’t realistic. He wouldn’t have had any trouble finding a woman with that castle.” What about the beastly appearance? “A lot of women like guys with hair.”

The original story (Wikipedia) was published in 1740. I’m wondering what the required-for-commercial-reasons updates say about our present-day culture. Let’s compare some of the differences:

original Disney
the dad was rich at one time the dad was a continuously poor artist
Belle is one of six kids Belle is an only child
“The sons ask for weaponry and horses to hunt with, whereas his oldest daughters ask for clothing, jewels, and the finest dresses possible as they think his wealth has returned.” No glory-hungry brothers or cash-hungry sisters.
“The Beast was a prince who lost his father at a young age, and whose mother had to wage war to defend his kingdom. The queen left him in care of an evil fairy, who tried to seduce him when he became an adult; when he refused, she transformed him into a beast.”

Moral: Tough to find good child care even when you’re a queen?

Prince’s mom died, not the dad. Prince developed a bad character from spending too much time with his father (also had a bad character).

Readers: What do the above changes say about our society? What did you think of the movie?

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The Burner at work

Inbound email distributed to the entire staff at a fairly large and stodgy Boston-area non-profit organization:

Hi there,

Can you please tell me if there is a person working there who attends Burning Man Festival? Maybe Deborah? Her name at the festival was Bubbles. I met her when she was serving drinks at the bar… If she still works there can you please pass on my email to her?

Many thanks,

Jennifer

My suggested response: “She probably means the Bubbles who works in Accounting.”

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Tyler Cowen asks if we can do big projects

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream by Tyler Cowen paints a moderately bleak picture of Americans as screen-addicted couch potatoes:

In past generations, people moved through the physical world at ever faster speeds, whereas today traffic gets worse each year and plane travel is, if anything, slower than before.

The big practical questions for the postwar generation were about what we might place in the physical world and how that would exert its effects on us, because the physical world was viewed as a major source of inspiration. Would it be cities reaching into the heavens, underwater platforms, or colonies in outer space? All of these possibilities were embedded with futuristic architectures and also utopian ideologies, such as space travel bringing humankind together in cosmopolitan dreams of peace. Those options seemed like logical next steps for a world that had recently been transformed by railroads, automobiles, urbanization, and many other highly visible shifts in what was built, how we got around, and how things looked. But over the last few decades, the interest in those kinds of transportation-based, landscape-transforming projects largely has faded away.

We’re much more comfortable with the world of information, which is more static, can be controlled at our fingertips, and can be set to our own speed. That’s very good for some people—most of all the privileged class, which is very much at home in this world—and very bad for others. The final form of stasis has to do with how and where we place our individual bodies. Most of all, it seems we like to stay home and remove ourselves altogether from the possible changes of the external physical world.

Americans can literally have almost every possible need cared for without leaving their homes. This is a new form of American passivity, where a significant percentage of the population is happy to sit around and wait for contentment to be delivered.

only about half of the Millennial Generation bothers to get a driver’s license by age eighteen; in 1983, the share of seventeen-year-olds with a license was 69 percent.

In 1965, the most common leisure activity for American kids was outdoor play. Recent surveys suggest that the average American nine-year-old child spends fifty hours a week—by direct comparison, nearly seven hours a day—or more looking at electronic screens, which include televisions, computers, and cell phones.

We’re not doing the awesome stuff that we used to do…

One final way of thinking about progress, sometimes stressed by Silicon Valley venture capitalist Peter Thiel, is to ask whether the era of grand projects is mostly over. In the twentieth century, American grand projects included the Manhattan Project, which was highly successful, and cemented an era of Pax Americana. Two other grand projects were winning World War II and, starting in the 1950s, construction of the interstate highway system, both examples of thinking big and changing the world permanently on a large scale. The Apollo moon program was another grand project, and although its usefulness can be questioned, its mechanical success and above all its speed of execution cannot. At its peak it consumed over 2 percent of American GDP.29 “Defeating communism” is perhaps too abstract to qualify as a specific project, but it is another major victory backed by a coordinated effort. Another potential nominee would be “construction of a social welfare state,” although parts of this are politically controversial. In any case, a lot of these grand projects succeeded, often rather spectacularly. If we look at the last twenty-five years or so, what do we have to count as grand projects? Some people might cite the environmental movement, but for all of its virtues, we are still living in a world where biodiversity is plummeting, carbon emissions are rising, and the overall human footprint on the environment, including from the United States, is increasing. So this is a possible contender for the future, but no, it hasn’t happened just yet. Reforestation and cleaner air and water are major triumphs, but those happened much earlier in the twentieth century. The most obvious and most successful grand project today is that virtually every part of the United States is wired to the internet and cell phone system. You can go to almost any inhabited part of the country and immediately access Wikipedia or make a phone call to Africa; sometimes this even works on hiking trails or in other out-of-the-way places, ensuring we are never that far away from communicating with any and all of our friends and relations or maybe business associates.

When we try to do something big, it usually turns out badly

The other potential grand project would have to be … reconstructing Iraq, making Iraq democratic, and bringing peace to the Middle East. On that project we have seen a miserable failure, and with the rise of ISIS and the collapse of Syria, the situation is becoming much worse yet. So the post-1990 era for the United States is scored at one out of two. I don’t, by the way, count Obamacare on this list of grand projects. No matter what you think of it as policy, it provided health insurance to about 10 to 15 million of America’s previously uninsured 40 million–plus population, with the exact number for new coverage still evolving. That helps many of those individuals, but it is hardly a game-changer in terms of a broader social trajectory, especially since many of those people already were receiving partial health care coverage and, furthermore, the Obamacare exchanges are experiencing some serious problems. If anything, Obamacare has locked in the basic features of the previous U.S. health care system rather than revolutionizing them.

But could it be that the world isn’t stagnating, it is just that Americans are terrible at “big systems” thinking and public infrastructure? The Chinese, for example, have built about 14,000 miles of high-speed rail out of what will eventually be a 24,000-mile system (Wikipedia). About 1.5 billion rides occur per year on a system that did not exist a decade ago. The Chinese are building airports at a frantic pace and the transportation options for middle-class Chinese citizens improve dramatically every year. Cowen is a bit of a China fan:

Even with its recent economic troubles, China has a culture of ambition and dynamism and a pace of change that hearken back to a much earlier America. China, even though it is in the midst of some rather serious economic troubles, makes today’s America seem staid and static. For all of its flaws, China is a country where every time you return, you find a different and mostly better version of what you had left the time before. Hundreds or thousands of new buildings will be in place, the old restaurants will be gone, and what were major social and economic problems a few years ago, such as unfinished roads or missing water connections, will have disappeared or been leapfrogged. That is what life is like when a country grows at about 10 percent a year for over thirty years running, as indeed China had been doing up through 2009 or so, with some years of 7 to 8 percent growth thereafter (and an unknown rate of growth today, due to lack of trust in the government’s numbers). When a country’s growth rate is 10 percent, it’s as if a new country is being built every seven years or so, because that is how long it takes for such a nation to double in economic size.

Meanwhile, in the U.S. it is often illegal to work:

Some of the decline in labor mobility may stem from the law itself, specifically the growth of occupational licensure. In the 1950s, only about 5 percent of workers required a government-issued license to do their jobs, but by 2008, that figure had risen to about 29 percent.

The data show that individuals in tightly licensed occupations demonstrate lower levels of cross-state mobility. For instance, men in heavily licensed occupations are less likely to move across state lines than men in less heavily licensed occupations, even after adjusting for demographic variables that might cause the two groups to differ. Those same men, reluctant to cross state lines and lose licensure rights, are not less reluctant to move around within their states, where they keep their licenses.

Or you’ll get sued as a result of hiring someone:

It’s also harder to fire workers than it was several decades ago, in part because of fear of lawsuits over discrimination, as American society has steadily become more litigious. This means that some employers will be less likely to hire in the first place, in order to minimize their lawsuit risks. They look more for the kind of workers they will not need to fire or not need to replace anytime soon, which also slows down the pace of job turnover.

So we sit around reading prissy Jane Austen novels (or, since we’re screen-addicted, watching movie adaptions):

Current philosophies and aesthetics mirror this shift toward the calm. The metaphysics of the big political debates of the 1960s now strike us as absurd. In the 1970s, intellectual, angst-ridden American teenagers noodled over Nietzsche, the meaning of the counterculture, and the classic Russian novels of ideas. Woody Allen satirized these books in his movie Love and Death, and it was assumed that enough of the viewers would catch the references. These days Jane Austen is the canonical classic novelist, with the Wall Street Journal even referring to “the Jane Austen industry.” And a lot of her stories are about … matching. For better or worse, these stories are less concerned with the titanic struggle of good versus evil—can you imagine Mr. Darcy shouting, as would a Dostoyevsky character, “If there is no God, then everything is permitted!”? Instead people are afraid of having their calm disturbed, so the frontier issue in many colleges and universities is whether to put “trigger warnings” on school curricula, out of fear that somebody will be offended or traumatized by what we used to welcome as radical and revisionist texts.

Cowen sounds pessimistic about the 325 million souls here in the U.S. It is tough to argue that he is wrong. A friend points out that regulatory compliance is the true religion of the U.S.: “People used to spend a huge amount of time in the Middle Ages going to church and praying. Now they spend about 40 percent of their time doing regulatory compliance so it has the same place in our society that religion had in theirs.”

But why do we need to be innovative? The Chinese are great at engineering (look at DJI!) and building infrastructure. Let them vacuum the CO2 out of the atmosphere. Singapore and Switzerland are full of rich well-educated hard-working people. They will presumably develop all kinds of new ideas for us. The Iranians and Koreans have already shown that they can make more interesting movies than Americans. The world might be a way better place in 50 years even if no American were to create anything useful between now and 2067. Do you really need Xbox to get through 99 weeks of cashing unemployment checks if you have Nintendo and PlayStation?

Cowen is optimistic about our social freedoms:

This relatively recent emphasis on security pops up in so many forms, many of them extremely beneficial for our lives. For instance, the acceptance of gay marriage has proved a big (and to me pleasant) surprise. As recently as 2008, neither Barack Obama nor Hillary Clinton would endorse national gay marriage, and they both openly expressed reservations about the idea.

Even within the community of gay and LGBT intellectuals, the gay marriage movement was not entirely popular. Michael Warner, for instance, a leading “queer theorist,” argued that marriage was too conservative an institution and what the gay community needed instead was a radical liberation from the idea of shame. Warner wanted straights to learn from the sexual practices of gays at

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Tyler Cowen on why the big get bigger and more boring

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream by Tyler Cowen shares some data about the big getting bigger:

A recent Wall Street Journal analysis of data from the University of Southern California found that, by federal antitrust standards, there is a high degree of concentration in nearly a third of all industries, compared to about a quarter of all industries in 1996. Or to cite another metric based on the same data, nearly two-thirds of publicly traded companies were selling in more concentrated markets in 2013 than earlier in 1996. Yet another measure is this: Of the more than 1,700 public companies in existence in both 1996 and 2013, 62 percent saw their share of the market go up over that same period of time.11 What is driving these developments? Most likely, some leading firms have the ability and intent to launch well-known national brands backed by extensive marketing and product development, and other, smaller firms cannot match their pace. The result is that some markets have a greater element of winner-take-all, as is suggested by the data on corporate valuations. If we look at the S&P 500 stock index in 1975, the category of “intangible assets” accounted for about 18 percent of the value of American capital. Most American capital was in physical assets, such as machines and factories, tangible items that can be purchased and replicated if need be. Today, over 80 percent of the value of the S&P 500 is due to intangible assets, including trademarks, patents, brand name reputation, consumer goodwill, and other factors. That’s a big leap upward, from below 20 percent to above 80 percent for the value of corporate intangibles.

And if you’re big you tend to be boring…

Second, many intangibles rest on reputation and image. If Google alienated most Americans with an ongoing series of offensive remarks and behavior, users would jump to Bing or to other search engines, just as many customers have left Chipotle because of its association with E. coli outbreaks. Furthermore, if Google lost its image as a cutting-edge place to work, it could lose its ability to recruit top talent. Once companies have ascended the mountain, they play it safe. They have no interest at that point in “disruption,” and they try to offend as few users, or potential employees, as possible.

In 2014, the Mozilla CEO stepped down, basically for having donated to anti–gay marriage campaigns, even though at the time most Americans did not seem to favor the legality of gay marriage. Whether or not you worry about the constraints on speech brought by such firings, it’s a sign that some kinds of risk-taking are over. We’ve also seen a lot of companies end or postpone expansions into North Carolina due to the 2016 passage in that state of a law perceived as hostile to transgender individuals. Again, the net result is that companies will obsess all the more over legal matters and public relations, sometimes at the expense of growing their business or focusing on the physical product or taking chances. We see corporate cultures stressing the law and also public relations, two inherently conservative corporate departments that are rarely sources of major innovations.12 Still further evidence for growing monopolization, and for that matter the social stasis it feeds, is what is sometimes called “the investment drought.” That is, businesses just aren’t investing as much as they used to. Net capital investment, as a share of gross domestic product, has been declining since the 1980s. An alternative measure of the value of capital services, a ten-year moving average which avoids the “noise” in the data for any single year, has been declining since the start of the millennium. It hit almost 5 percent of GDP around the turn of the millennium, but since then it has fallen steadily and is now hovering at about 2 percent of GDP. This again means that America is not replenishing its future sources of innovation, growth, and ability to pay higher wages because the future capital just won’t be there to the same extent.

If we adjust for increases in the American working-age population, the United States creates 25 percent fewer triadic patents per person than it did in 1999. (A triadic patent is one filed in the United States, Europe, and Japan, and tends to be a relatively serious patent in terms of potential scope.)

The central planners in Washington, D.C. have hugely favored higher education over the past few decades, showering them with tax dollars in the forms of student loan guarantees, grants, etc. State and local governments have been pumping more cash into K-12 education as well. What’s the result?

Two of today’s most rapidly growing sectors seem especially hostile to turnover and business dynamism, and they are not even counted in the standard business statistics. If we look at higher education, the list of top universities is barely different from what it was seventy years or even one hundred years ago, apart from having added some West Coast contenders, such as Stanford and UC Berkeley. The sociologist Kieran Healy made an explicit comparison of today’s best schools using a listing of the best schools from a 1911 report by a Mr. Kendrick Charles Babcock. For the more mature regions of the United States, it’s all a bunch of recognizable first-tier names, including Harvard, Princeton, Columbia, and, well … do I need to give you the whole list?8 There has been considerable innovation in what has been taught and how universities are organized, but at the top, America’s higher education sector does not have a whole lot of turnover; nor have innovative unicorn firms or schools taken over. For primary education, of course, most school systems are municipal, and they hardly budge for decades, although there is some dynamism from a recent wave of charter schools. As mentioned, low turnover in this sector isn’t new, but education and higher education are taking on larger and more important roles in the American economy, and that represents an increase in stasis from a business point of view.

Not everyone is getting fat…

when you zero in on male wages, the picture becomes truly disconcerting. The median male wage was higher in 1969 than it is today. That’s a shocking fact, given earlier expectations of ongoing economic progress, and not many economists of that time, of any political stripe, would have predicted that to happen without a major catastrophe or global war. A big chunk of our economic gains have been driven by women getting better educations and working longer hours. That is good news for many women, but if the American economy were more dynamic, we would expect the males to have rising real wages just because so many technological advances have been dumped in their laps.

Even the most recent trends are discouraging. If we take out the gains of the top earners, take-home pay for typical American workers has been falling since the Great Recession ended in 2009, an unusual path for an economic recovery. According to one good estimate, median wages for the American economy as a whole fell 4 percent from 2009 to 2014. There are also wage declines within a lot of occupations. For instance, median pay for restaurant cooks fell by 8.9 percent, and for home health aides, the median wage fell by 6.2 percent, even though the dining and health care sectors have been relatively robust in terms of both revenue and employment.

[As with most academic economists, Cowen attributes the lack of wage growth to stagnation in productivity.]

Can we expect a peasant uprising as these median earners watch the parade of Teslas passing them by? Cowen says no.

Many of the seminal events of the civil rights movement could not happen today, most of all because society is more bureaucratized, more safety obsessed, and also less tolerant of any kind of disturbance or disruption at all. Take the Selma marchers. It would be very difficult for a Selma-style march to happen today, and that is not because all civil rights grievances have been solved. In 1965, the Selma marchers had obtained the legal right, through petition, to conduct a fifty-two-mile, five-day march down an interstate highway. Of course, that blocked the highway, and for the most part such march permissions are impossible to obtain today, no matter how popular the political movement may be. Most motorists and truckers just don’t want the highway shut down. Starting in the 1970s, the federal courts began to assert that public spaces are not automatically “fair game” for marches and demonstrations, and so local governments have sought to please users of such facilities rather than marchers.

The disputes over a neo-Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois, made it clear to local governments that an undisputed de facto right of public assembly could be very costly. In 1977, a neo-Nazi group had petitioned for the right to stage a march in the predominantly Jewish community of Skokie.

local governments felt burned, in this case and in several others. If they could not prohibit undesirable marches, they would regulate them, if not out of existence, then into the less-visible and less-focal parts of their urban and suburban spaces. A new, slow war began, this one to make sure that demonstrators could not use the physical spaces they most desired. If arbitrary or capricious restrictions on demonstrations were not to be allowed, then regular restrictions, applicable to everyone, would take their place.

Washington, DC, is in some ways even more restrictive. The National Park Service controls about 25 percent of the city, including many of the focal protest spots. For those locations, any protest of more than twenty-five people requires a permit. Furthermore, if the event is expected to be of any note, the protest organizers will be required to meet with the Park Police and possibly the Capitol Police to plan it out, accompanied by lawyers in many cases. Still further complications arise if the Secret Service is involved.16 And post 9/11, Washington, DC, protests face yet another problem: They are possible sanctuaries for terror attacks, or at least they are perceived as such. If the City Park Service or some other bureaucracy sees some possibility of a terror attack connected to a protest, or even believes that a facility or public locale may become slightly more vulnerable, it can deny permission for the event, very often with impunity.

It is by no means impossible to receive permission, but you have to work through the bureaucracy. There now exists a mini-industry of “protest planners,” comparable to wedding or convention planners, and they charge fees to boot. They will help you coordinate with the police, set up stages and sound systems in the approved manner, and clean up after the event is over. These days, a DC protest is more of a bureaucratized event than anything else, and typically it is viewed by the media as such, or in other words it is ignored unless it has massive attendance. For better or worse, this whole process is a long way removed from the older custom of shouting and gathering an angry, demanding crowd in the local town square.

[Cowen does not address the question of Donald Trump’s connection to the neo-Nazis in Skokie circa 1977.]

Cowen suggests that ultimately there will be a reckoning here in the U.S. There actually might be a peasant revolt and the election of Donald Trump is a harbinger of that, according to Cowen. But he doesn’t seem to take seriously (or work to refute) the possibility of stagnation. Britain stagnated from the end of World War II until Margaret Thatcher came along. The U.S. is more or less modeled along British lines. Why can’t we stagnate? (in January 2009 I asked the same question and we have bumbled along with sluggish economic growth in the intervening years)

More: read The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream

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Is there anything exciting about the Samsung S8?

Readers: Samsung itself says that the S8 uses the same camera sensor as the S7. Is this where we stop reading about the new phone? Of course, that’s still a better sensor than in the iPhone 7/7S, according to DxOMark (my personal experience is consistent with the DxOMark objective tests; the S7 was a better camera than anything from Apple).

You can dock the phone to use it as a desktop computer, but the result is more like a Chromebook than like my 2005 idea of a “dock” that actually is a PC.

This review says the S8 is the best phone available, but it still might not be exciting enough to get down to the Verizon store.

Journalists who live in urban (and almost all-white!) neighborhoods aren’t going to bother testing phone call performance in the tower-free exurbs (the S7 that I tried was not as good as an iPhone 6 Plus in hanging onto a weak signal). Right now they are writing about new Samsung software bundled into the phone as though that were a good thing rather than a terrifying prospect.

Apparently it is too much to ask for a slightly thicker phone with a bigger camera sensor and corresponding higher image quality. How did we get to the point where the market is cluttered with options and they are all pretty much the same?

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Tyler Cowen: U.S. has a lot of upward mobility… for immigrants

The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream by Tyler Cowen discusses the current complaint about the U.S. being a tougher place for upward mobility:

Since a poor Mexican household might only be earning a few thousand dollars of income a year, even a move to a “mediocre” U.S. job paying $22,000 is a lot of upward mobility.

Any country with a lot of immigration will have much more upward mobility than its published numbers indicate. And if you look at the United States today, about 13 percent of the population is foreign-born, the highest level since the 1920s. For the most part, these people came from poorer countries, and thus that is a lot of unmeasured upward mobility. So if you read a comparison between, say, the United States and Denmark claiming that intergenerational mobility is higher in Denmark, that comparison is either wrong or at the very least misleading. Denmark hasn’t elevated nearly as many immigrants, in either absolute or percentage terms, as America. At most Denmark has more income mobility for its ongoing domestic generations who are staying within the country. When it comes to international comparisons of income mobility, the United States gets a bad rap because, whether you like it or not, this country specializes in upward mobility for immigrants.

What about helping the vulnerable? Virtuous Facebookers love to cite Europe as a paradise of welfare handouts.

It’s a common view that the Western European nations have well-developed welfare states while the United States enforces a kind of cutthroat social Darwinism. That caricature is far from the truth. It is true that often the United States deploys social welfare funds wastefully or inefficiently, but the American government still spends plenty relative to Europe on protecting its citizenry against risk, or at least the American government is trying to do so, and that is unlikely to change. Consider a simple comparison: The American government spends more on Americans’ health care (per capita) than the French government spends on their entire health care system (again in per capita terms).

using some very plausible metrics, the American government is more involved in health care than is the French government.

If you just add up direct government expenditures on social programs as a percentage of GDP, the United States comes out toward the lower end of the scale, with France, Finland, Belgium, and Denmark leading the way. That fits in with the traditional picture of America being a social welfare laggard of sorts. But if we look at what are called tax expenditures, the picture shifts radically. Tax expenditures refer to the use of the tax system to induce individuals or corporations to take one set of decisions rather than another, and they include tax-favored private charity, tax-favored pensions, tax-favored health insurance, and a variety of other benefits that the American government has a large indirect hand in encouraging. Here is the bottom line, according to the OECD (again in per capita terms): “In the United States public social spending is relatively low, but total social spending is the second highest in the world.” In other words, American governments go to great lengths to make their citizens feel safe and protected; they are just more likely to use the tax system than direct expenditures. And if you add in defense spending as a kind of broader social protection, against both foreign aggression and terrorism, the American government invests in safety all the more, in this regard more than any other country in the world, including in per capita terms.

OECD says that we’re #2 in welfare state spending. Can we get to the #1 spot once the Trumpenfuhrer is replaced by someone approved by the elites? Cowen says maybe not:

Since 1970, American survey respondents show no greater preference for government redistribution. Furthermore, two notable groups show considerably weaker support for redistributive ideas and policies over time. The elderly decreased their support for redistribution by an amount that is more than half the distance between Democrats and Republicans on this question. Perhaps more surprisingly, African Americans also have decreased their support for redistribution, with almost half of this change coming from decreased support for race-based forms of government aid. This is in spite of the fact that the black-white wealth gap has been widening rather than narrowing. A lot of African Americans think race relations in America have worsened, but economic redistribution does not seem to be at the center of these concerns.

More: read The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream.

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Uber demonstrates that diversity is irrelevant or harmful to business success?

Uber published a report on how their tech staff is 85 percent male and, generally, they hire few non-white/non-Asians within the U.S. (see, e.g., New York Times). The founder/CEO (a.k.a. “rich white guy”) says that the company has “a commitment to change.” Part of the Times coverage is based on a female site reliability engineer (new name for “syadmin”?) who wrote about her boss “looking for women to have sex with”.

[One angle I am pretty sure that the New York Times did not cover: Given the typical disparity (inequality?) in pay of a Silicon Valley startup company, in which the earlier arrivals receive stock grants or options worth 10X or 100X what later-hired folks doing the same job get, and given the California child support formula, a woman could get lot more cash for having sex with a senior/early Uber employee than by working as a junior/late-hired Uber employee.]

The message of the study and the article seems to be that Uber has done something regrettable by building a non-diverse workforce. However, given that the company is one of the most successful business enterprises ever created (see, e.g. Business Insider and this article on how Uber grew faster than Facebook), could these data be interpreted in another way? If we assume that diversity of workforce had any effect on company success, why isn’t it just as plausible that the lack of diversity was somehow helpful? One argument for diversity in tech and in management is that it impossible for white/Asian guys to understand diverse customers. Uber would seem to disprove that theory. The drivers come from all over the world and are based all over the world. The customers are similarly about as diverse as any customer base could be (essentially anyone who wants to get from Point A to Point B, has a phone, and can afford $5). Why isn’t Uber the ultimate demonstration that the market brings together people from different backgrounds? (i.e., you might not ever go to a mosque, but you’ll take a ride from a Muslim driver if he or she is the closest to you; you might not have any white/male American friends but you’ll use a service run by white/male Americans)

[Not to beat a dead horse too much, but given that the New York Times argues separately that gender is fluid and unmoored to genetics, why do they report as credible Uber’s categorization of employees into “men” and “women”? How would Uber know what the gender identification of their workers is going to be tomorrow morning, for example?]

Readers: What do you think? Does publicizing the fact that one of the world’s most rapidly successful companies is mostly white/Asian guys make other employers say “Whoa. Let’s try not to end up like those Uber founders, early-hired managers, and investors”?

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Is it normal to have latency in a Bluetooth mouse?

The Dell XPS 13 2-in-1 computer that I purchased demonstrated multiple failures and defects, but I am wondering if one of the annoying behaviors was normal.

Suppose that you have a Bluetooth mouse connected to a laptop. You don’t use it for a couple of minutes because you’re typing on the keyboard. You touch the mouse. Is it normal for the mouse/computer to ignore the first second of motion/input? That was sort of the best case performance of any Bluetooth mouse and the Dell (the worst-case for Bluetooth was that the machine would ignore all mouse input after a brief functional period).

Readers: Have you ever tried a Bluetooth mouse? Does it function like a wired mouse or is there a latency period if you try to point after a minute or two of idle time?

[Separately, I continue to be awed by Dell’s strategy for avoiding handling returns. If you call their return line they put you in various loops for 20-30 minutes at a time until you give up. Eventually you might connect to a human who will then say “Oh, it has been more than 30 days since your invoice was generated so we can’t process a return.” I’m not sure how they can sustain this given that the credit card chargeback time limit is 120 days. Do they just wait to see if consumers will do a chargeback for defective goods and then issue a refund rather than fight with Visa/MC/Amex?]

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