Continuing my report on Eccentric Orbits: The Iridium Story, one of the Wall Street Journal “20 books that defined our year” for 2016.
The central figure in the book is Dan Colussy, a former Coast Guard officer who ran Pan Am for 10 years and then did a rollup of government contractors called United Nuclear Corporation, sold to GE in 1997.
The central villain is Motorola. They had insurance against their satellites falling out of the sky and hitting people but it wasn’t of unlimited duration. When Iridium went bankrupt, after paying out most of the funds raised to Motorola itself, the Motorola executives desperately wanted to de-orbit the $6 billion worth of satellites, thereby insuring that their investors and partners (the gateway owners, the handset manufacturer Kyocera, et al.) would be left with nothing.
Who was partying with the bondholders’ cash during the Chapter 11 proceedings that started in August 1999?
The legal profession was very happy to assist in the demise, restructuring, and rebirth of Iridium, and by one estimate the lawyers were burning through $4 million a month in fees approved by the bankruptcy court. You had lawyers for Iridium, lawyers for the creditors, lawyers for Motorola, lawyers for Boeing, and lawyers for every gateway. You had lawyers on staff and outside lawyers for specialized matters like licensing and insurance. The White House counsel was involved, as were the employees of the biggest lawyer of them all, Attorney General Janet Reno. There were lawyers from the Departments of Commerce, Defense, State, and Treasury, including one—David Cohen—whose title was Senior Counsel to General Counsel in the Office of the General Counsel. Colussy hired lawyers to deal with the FCC, the various aviation insurance companies in Paris and London, and the International Telecommunication Union in Geneva.
What was the risk? The good news for fans of climate change fans is that the “science was settled.” After all, the formulae for orbital mechanics go back to Isaac Newton, 1684-7. Estimate #1:
[NASA] said the chances of being hit by falling debris would be 249 to 1, with the chance of an actual death at 40,000 to 1. The NASA analyst believed that, in addition to the titanium fuel tank, five other parts would survive reentry: the battery, three structural brackets, and the electronic control panel.
Estimate #2:
Risk assessments carried out by aviation insurance experts hired by Boeing estimated the probability of personal injury from de-orbiting the Iridium satellite system at 1 in 1.063 trillion.
Nobody ever figured out how to reconcile these apparently conflicting results.
No technology is so beautiful that it couldn’t be ruined by software developers:
Each country billed its Iridium phone service in local currency, and each customer had a choice of four different service plans. That meant that a call could originate in a country licensed to use Zambian kwachas, go through a gateway priced in Brazilian reals, and terminate over landlines priced in Peruvian nuevo soles. If the phone had been purchased in, say, Oslo, then all of this would have to be fed into the Reston computers, where it was converted into South African rands for the originating gateway and Saudi riyals for the gateway owners, translated into American dollars for Iridium, and summarized in a monthly bill denominated in Norwegian kroner. The diciest part of the whole system was the terminating leg of the call—the part that continued on land after the satellites passed it down. These “tail charges” could be as low as 4 cents a minute or as high as $2.50 a minute, depending on where the call ended up, and that was on top of the already exorbitant Iridium per-minute charges—anywhere from $3 to $7. Iridium had hired Andersen Consulting to program ten million lines of computer code for the billing system, but the system was unstable, functioning so erratically that Leo Mondale eventually developed an in-house Excel system that worked just as well. Naturally the customers were annoyed by the unpredictability of it all, and one of the first decisions Colussy made was to change all billing to one price and one plan. Iridium would get 80 American cents per minute, period. Service providers could charge whatever they wanted—most charged around $1.50—but the wholesale price was 80 cents. (Ten years later, that was still the Iridium price.)
The U.S. government was an important future customer, but because hadn’t yet invaded Afghanistan or Iraq, people in Washington and at the Pentagon didn’t feel a huge urgency. The U.S. government was also critical for dealing with Motorola, which insisted on a total release of liability above and beyond what any commercial insurance policy might cover.
The Washington bureaucracy fully deserved its reputation, and any agency with the word “license” or “permit” in its charter was bound to be staffed by an army of people whose deliberately measured passive-aggressive voices threatened to put you to sleep at any moment. The goal of the process seemed to be the collection of bulky brown folders full of data.
Colussy hires the right lobbyists, though
… senior partner at the vast Sidley Austin firm, to carry his case before the FCC, the insurance companies, and any other regulatory agencies that cropped up and to ensure that all the licenses were transferred. In the rarefied world of “regulatory enforcement law,” Carter Phillips was king, having been an Assistant Solicitor General before going into private practice, and currently holding second place on the all-time list of cases argued before the Supreme Court (in excess of fifty)—cases touching such obscure and complex parts of the federal bureaucracy that, if placed end to end in a bound volume, would render the most dedicated law student comatose.
Eventually he gets to the right person in the Pentagon:
In many ways a meeting with the Deputy Secretary had an air of seriousness that meetings with the SecDef lacked, mainly because you knew that, at the end of the meeting, the decision was likely to be made one way or the other. The SecDef was the person you talked to at the beginning of a process. The DepSec was the last person you talked to.
“I have a message for your CEO,” said [Rudy] deLeon. “Tell Mr. Galvin that if I hear one more fucking threat to bring these satellites down, then his corporation is going to have a really hard time doing business with the Pentagon in the future.” The room went still. “I will give him that message,” said Schaffner. “All right,” said deLeon, “we should all now work together to get the constellation indemnified so that we can move forward without destroying it.”
More than a year after the bankruptcy filing, the Pentagon wakes up a bit:
in October [2000], USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer out of Norfolk, Virginia, was going through a routine refueling stop at the port of Aden, in Yemen, after coming through the Suez Canal. It had pulled up next to a “dolphin” platform—the equivalent of an offshore gas station—… Forty-eight minutes after refueling began, an inflatable small craft manned by Ibrahim al-Thawr and Abdullah al-Misawa was seen pulling alongside the Cole by the duty officer. Al-Thawr and al-Misawa both stood at military attention and saluted as they approached. What was impossible to see from the deck was that the two men were standing on top of 250 kilograms of composition C-4 plastic explosives, and once they pulled alongside, they used a detonator to blow a sixteen-hundred-square-foot gash in the side of the Cole, directly opposite the mess hall, while most of the crew was at lunch. The two al-Qaeda bombers died instantly, and the Navy casualty toll would end up being seventeen dead and thirty-nine injured. … But the communications center aboard the ship had been disabled by the explosion, so his only contact with the Cole was through a single phone, borrowed from the U.S. embassy—an Iridium phone.
Colussy was trying to get a contract from the Feds for $72 million for 20,000 phones, to be used worldwide, and unlimited minutes over a two-year period. (That’s $150 per month per user.) The military’s proposed alternative was going to cost at least $10 billion to construct. The repair of the Cole alone cost $250 million (source). Despite the comparatively miniscule cost of the Iridium contract, it seemed that the government had endless file cabinets full of bureaucrats who needed to look at it. This gave competitors time to poke around and lobby as well (it seems that senators were cheaper to buy than satellites):
Unfortunately, Senator Ted Stevens and Representative Jerry Lewis were not going away. Keith Bane, newly energized by the prospect of McCaw owning Iridium, had Motorola lobbyists in Washington working on Stevens, and even volunteered to make a call to the senator himself. The grassroots efforts in Stevens’ home state were starting to work as well. Sam Romey, a rough-and-tumble mountain man and service provider in northern Alaska, was so infuriated by the Stevens-Lewis letter that he had rounded up a contingent of Alaska State Troopers to talk to Stevens. But Bernie Schwartz wasn’t defeated so easily. One of the most powerful Democrats in the Senate—Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts—was now lobbying for Globalstar, calling the Pentagon to ask questions, but even that was not as surprising as the fact that one of the most powerful Republicans in the Senate had jumped onto the Schwartz bandwagon as well—Trent Lott of Mississippi.
Back in Washington, Dave Oliver called Colussy to say, “I have neutralized the Democratic side in Congress”—but now Globalstar had a new ally in the form of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). For weeks Oliver and deLeon had been coordinating all the approvals Iridium would need through a group of twelve agencies and departments, and there had been dozens of e-mails, memos, and PowerPoint presentations as they got ready for the showdown meeting in the Situation Room. (Dannie Stamp called it “organizing the circle jerk.”) But that debate had occurred without involving OMB. Now OMB had announced its intention to oppose the Iridium deal. Bringing OMB up to speed was like starting the whole process all over again, with every policy wonk in the city now alerted to a unique situation that read like a case study at the Kennedy School.
And then, as if the story couldn’t get any stranger, word came from Isaac Neuberger that weekend that President Clinton and [Motorola CEO] Chris Galvin were playing golf together in Vietnam. What he didn’t say was that on the golf course earlier that day, Galvin had spent most of the round telling Clinton that it was better to let the satellites be destroyed, because they had a life span of only five years anyway and some of them had already been flying for three years, so it was silly to go through all these machinations in Washington just to keep a constellation alive that couldn’t be replaced as satellites went out of commission. After all, who was going to throw another $6 billion after the $6 billion that had already been spent? Clinton was “spooked” by the remarks, according to Neuberger, and passed them along to Sperling.
Sperling was still jet-lagged from his 3:00 a.m. touchdown from Vietnam when he arrived at the West Wing to chair the Situation Room meeting on November 20. Keith Bane’s de-orbit deadline was two days away, and the battle lines had been clearly drawn. There were twenty-eight people present from nine departments and agencies, but only two mattered. The Office of Management and Budget was determined to change this deal or get rid of it entirely, and the Pentagon was determined to make it happen.
All of the alternatives to Iridium were technically inferior or still on the drawing board, so no matter how many politicians they bought the competitors couldn’t quite kill Iridium, e.g., Ted Stevens had to back off when Alaska State Troopers and natives told him that Iridium
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