Decline and Fall of the British Empire
Just finished The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781-1997, by Piers Brendon, an English historian. The book includes some interesting tidbits:
p120: Even in normal years Ireland hovered on the brink of starvation. By 1845 its population had risen to over eight million… [it is less than six million today] A Frenchman exclaimed, “I have seen the Indian in his forests and the negro in his irons, and I believed, in pitying their plight, that I saw the lowest ebb of human misery; but I did not then know the degree of poverty to be found in Ireland.” … By 1851, [end of the potato famine] perhaps a million had died and another 1.5 million had emigrated.
p169: In 1870, the U.S. and British economies were roughly equal in size; by 1914 the U.S. economy was three times larger. The British, however, maintained a leadership position in financial services. They’d lost their lead in manufacturing, but were doing a lot of banking.
p201: Africa was a continent “created to be a burden to Foreign Offices” according to Prime Minister Salisbury.
p319: “Because of the Russian pogroms, Jews all over the world tended to favour the Central Powers. By [supporting the creation of Israel], the Allies hoped to win their support [in World War I].”
p480: The British complained that the U.S. supported Jewish immigration to Palestine because Americans “do not want too many Jews in New York.”
The book is sprawling as was the Empire. One common thread is the incompetence and arbitrary power of colonial governors and staff. England’s best and brightest did not want to go out to India, Malta, Nigeria, or Burma. Civil servants devoted to adultery, alcohol, and accepting bribes, however, were willing to go. Usually the results were disastrous as arbitrary decisions were made with little deliberation or oversight from London, i.e., not too different from the U.S. occupation of Iraq (see my review of Imperial Life in the Emerald City).
Britain held sway over almost every type of people and terrain. Consequently, every type of independence process was tried by England and at least one colony. In some cases, the English nurtured local elites and gradually withdrew. In some cases, the English brutally suppressed local insurgents, torturing detainees and rounding up hundreds of thousands of sympathizers into concentration camps (e.g., Malaya). In others, the English simply packed up and left. With the exception of colonies that were primarily populated by European settlers, e.g., the U.S., Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, the results were similar. There would be violence between religious, ethnic, or political groups, and ultimately some sort of dictator would seize power. We Americans might study these examples as we prepare to shed some of our colonies, notably Iraq. It may not matter what we do or how and when we leave.
Much of the book is devoted to Britain’s most important colony: India. The presentation is a bit different than what you’d get reading a standard history of India as it includes much more about what was happening back in London and how India fit into the overall British imperial scheme. The failure of Gandhi’s attempt to keep India in one piece is covered thoroughly, including the violence started by Muslims anxious to have their own state (modern day Pakistan), but ultimately reciprocated by Hindus to the point that formerly congenial neighbors were killing each other by the thousands.
One take-away from the book is that it probably isn’t profitable to have an empire. It would be better to be a China, Japan, or Brazil than to be the U.S. Industrial competitiveness is more important than whatever temporary domination one can exert over a poorly developed and organized country.
[Note: This would be a good book to read on a Kindle due to its lack of relevant illustrations and maps and preponderance of 25-cent words that many folks will want to look up in the Kindle’s built-in dictionary.]
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