AOPA has a comparison of the Boeing 737NG versus the Airbus A320 from a pilot’s perspective. Here are some excerpts:
As far as pilot comfort goes, the Airbus is a leap ahead of the Boeing. The 737’s forward fuselage is the same as that of the 707, which was designed in the mid-1950s. It begins tapering to the nose in the first-class cabin, and by the time you get to the cockpit it’s a pretty small tube. The Airbus keeps its beamy width all the way to the cockpit, providing a commodious workplace for the pilots.
Airbus took its time designing the cockpit, resulting in a clean, logical layout that is well marked and void of any lights during normal operations. Everything is covered in plastic, so pilots don’t see the construction details underneath. There are ample air vents to keep you cool in the summer and (optional) foot warmers to keep your toes warm in the winter. There’s plenty of room for all your baggage, two jumpseaters, and all the duty-free purchases you can bring on. There’s no massive yoke, either, so you can cross your legs if you want. There’s also a clever table that extends from the panel on which to lay your charts/iPad or crew meal. No eating off your lap like in the 737. Finally, the Airbus cockpit is noticeably quieter than the 737.
Speaking of landings, the Airbus is much easier to land smoothly and, for pilots, it goes a long way to stroke our already-inflated egos. If you can consistently grease a 737NG landing, you’re a better pilot than most. The problem with that airplane, especially the long-bodied models, is that it lands so fast. Because tail strikes are a big threat for the long, low-slung airplanes, approach speeds are in the 150- to 160-knot range, which is about 40 knots or more above stall speed. All that extra speed keeps the long-bodied 737s flat to avoid tail strikes, but it also causes them to skip right back in the air at initial touchdown—just a few inches. It’s just long enough for the ground-spoiler system to sense wheel spin, at which point the spoilers deploy—right now! And it’s that second plop to the ground that makes the NGs one of the more difficult airplanes to consistently land well.
This also brings up a safety issue. There have been more than a few runway overruns in long-bodied 737s. They are heavy, they land fast, and they have only four main-wheel brakes—unlike a 757, which has eight brakes. Pilots who like to use all of the runway’s touchdown zone trying to squeak out a good landing are playing with fire in this airplane, especially on wet or contaminated runways. Remember, style points don’t count if you run off the end of the runway.
Separately, I’m wondering if the passengers on Flydubai 981 would all still be alive had that airplane operated Airbus A320s with envelope protection. The cause of the crash is thought to be improper stick-and-rudder handling? An Airbus would therefore have protected itself and the passengers by preventing a stall. On the third hand, AirAsia 8501 was supposedly stalled by the pilots. Wikipedia says that with the autopilot disconnected they also lost any envelope protection.
Young pilots: Think JetBlue!
[Also in the same issue, we learn that there is only one thing worse than starving as a freelance aviation photographer: “I was a Java coder and I couldn’t take it anymore.”]
That envelope protection is great when it works. It can make an average stick and rudder pilot into Sully, so he can cash in his celebrity for millions instead of chasing the elusive “aviation pension.” But in wretched conditions where the pitot-static system is overwhelmed envelope projection does nothing for you, as with the crash you mentioned and the AirFrance plane. Airbus or Boeing, your going… down.
I know nothing about cockpit design and operation. I know a great deal about nuclear generating station control room design and operation. Long (and sad) story short, the French were 20 years ahead of US in taking advantage of digital displays and human factors engineering (ergonomics) in nuclear control room design. During the nuclear build boom years in the US (1968 — 1979, TMI), control room design & layout was done by engineers. 90% of which have never operated a nuclear plant. They were mostly system engineers that had deep understanding of their system. But little understanding of integrated plant operations. That is, the control manipulations and necessary indicators to operate “the plant” as one complex system. Much like an engineer who never drove a car may locate the fuel gauge back at the fill nozzle. Nuclear control rooms of that generation had similar “quirks” and worse. (fyi.. Poor control room design was a significant contributor to Three Mile Island accident. The control room indication for an important valve showed the operator “demand” position. Not actual mechanical position. The operators place the control switch for the valve in the proper position, CLOSED. The control board position indicator also showed, CLOSED. However, the valve was actually stuck OPEN. And drained the reactor coolant system of water.)
One reason for advanced French design over the US was the long and painful qualification period for components used in US nuclear applications. US designers were limited to old 3-wire analog meters and relays long after digital displays and programmable logic controller (PLCs) were both available and reliable.
I suspect the above has something to do with Boeing vs Airbus cockpit design.
This article (in Russian) mentions in the end that only 4 out of 11 B-737 pilots were able to complete manual abort-second-landing simulated landing/approach, and all of them stated that it was so difficult to do that they found themselves totally stressed out (in relation to this incident:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatarstan_Airlines_Flight_363 )
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2949365
A couple of points.
The 737NG is the latest derivative of a plane which first took to the air in 1967. The first A320 flew in 1987. It’s a little unfair to compare cockpit creature comforts from designs twenty years apart.
Protection from improper stick and rudder handling, you say. What about the AA 587 which crashed in Queens in 2001, an Airbus A300?
What about the Bombarier C-Series? It has a modern avionics suite that was designed in the iPad era, rather than the Airbus’ flight computer than runs on a cpu from the 1980s and sometimes requires mid-flight reboots (says my A320 pilot brother-in-law).
I don’t want my pilots comfortable, I want them stiff-backed and laser-focused on pilotage.
The current 737s do seem to be completely outclassed by the 320, is not only a newer design, but was always intended to be a larger aircraft, rather than a 1960’s concept of a regional jet stricken by severe acromegaly.
The remainder of Boeing’s lineup, which are newer and closer to their original intended design, have much larger, quieter cockpits. Furthermore, compared to Airbus, Boeing’s design philosophy is more respectful of pilots: that space-hogging control yolk provides tactile feedback of the actions of the other pilot, and the software defers to the pilots’ inputs, even in extreme situations.
It seems to me that Airbus took the “fly by wire” thing too far, possibly because of the limitations of feedback technology at the time it was designed. There is no reason why the sidesticks should be independent – they should have been yoked together electronically with actuator motors, etc. Likewise the thrust lever positions should at all times correspond to the actual throttle position of the engines by means of a feedback system. The pilot should be able to use the position of the controls not only to command the aircraft but also as “gauges” to understand what inputs are being sent – otherwise it is all too easy to lose situational awareness just as in the Three Mile Island example given.