Software produced by committee is less secure?
According to this article, Hugo Teso, German computer security expert, determined that the very latest communication systems and software approved by the FAA and its counterparts worldwide are “unencrypted and unauthenticated.” The end result is that he was able to write Android software to reprogram Boeing jets’ avionics from a mobile phone.
This is somewhat surprising result considering that the software and systems in question are the subject of years of certification review by sizable committees of extremely risk-averse individuals. I would have expected that the committee-intensive nature of the process would slow development and innovation but would increase security due to the fact that this should be precisely the kind of thing that a reviewer would be looking for.
I was recently out at Robinson Helicopter Company for recurrent training. The CEO was asked why the company had not released any helicopters with glass cockpit instruments (LCD screens instead of mechanical gauges and gyros). Such instruments are actually approved for aftermarket certification, the CEO said, but the FAA keeps asking for more and more paperwork to justify why the factory should be able to install them. Keep in mind that this is for a helicopter that cannot legally be flown in instrument conditions and therefore the pilot can and does fly safely simply by looking out the window. An instrument failure in a Robinson helicopter has no safety consequence.
[According to the CEO, about three years ago the FAA simply stopped acting. Their former glacial pace changed to something more like plate tectonics. He didn’t have an explanation for this but I note that this roughly coincides with the collapse of the private aviation industry from 2008-2010. An FAA employee is now probably paid about 8 times per hour what he or she might earn in the private sector (the salaries are not 8X higher, of course, but consider the actual number of working hours demanded) so the consequences of being fired are enormous. The easiest way to avoid being fired is to avoid acting. If you don’t approve something you can’t be blamed when something turns out not to work.]
A single dissenting voice can hold up an aircraft design for years. The new Robinson R66, for example, caught the attention of a Canadian government worker (story). He looked at the 400 psi hydraulic system on the Robinson and said “There was a failure in a Sikorsky’s 2000 psi system a few years ago. Prove to me that the Robinson system doesn’t need some extra redundancy so as to avoid a situation like that.” Robinson pointed out that the R66’s hydraulic flight control assistance system was virtually identical to that which was flying uneventfully in about 5000 R44s worldwide but this was unavailing. The Canadian dissenter did not hold up U.S. certification but he managed to get the Europeans and Russians to deny certification and that has cost Robinson perhaps $100 million in sales thus far (80 percent of Robinson’s sales are to foreign countries; supposedly 2013 will be the year when the helicopter is finally certified worldwide, three years later than in the U.S. due to this one Canadian guy; note that the original Canadian dissenter eventually took a closer look and apologized for making such a big fuss, but of course it is Robinson that bears all of the costs).
It seems reasonable to expect that a couple of trailblazing developers, excited to get their new protocols and systems into the hands of users, would leave open a security hole. But why doesn’t adding layers upon layers of review by committee and years of delay result in one committee member raising his or her hand to ask “Shouldn’t this be encrypted?”
Full post, including comments



